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Background
In the model of cheap talk communication, uninformed agents (receivers) receive pos-
sibly noisy messages from informed agents (senders) who are possibly dishonest. Talk 
is cheap because the communication between the two types of agents does not directly 
affect the payoffs regarding the messages both agents obtain from the game. The way the 
messages matter is by changing the receiver’s belief about the sender’s type, the mes-
sages can change the receiver’s action, which affects both agents’ payoffs indirectly.
The study of cheap talk models was motivated by the inefficiency resulted from asym-
metric information. As noted by Sobel (2013), with differences in information, agents 
can improve their outcomes with direct, costless communication. However, the informa-
tion cannot be transmitted faithfully when information sender has conflict of interest. 
The receiver has to identify whether the information came from costless communica-
tion is creditable or not. In the past few years, the cheap talk communication has been 
extended to multiple agents and different kinds of communicating networks, like Krishna 
and Morgan (2001), Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), Klumpp (2007) and Li (2010). These 
models are based on the assumption that the uninformed receiver gets information from 
his neighbors who has fixed links with him. The information dissemination network was 
established from the initial period and would not be changed during the game. Unin-
formed receivers have fixed information sources and would not search a more reliable 
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information source. Difference with these previous studies, Our study establishes an 
agent-based model (Schoham and Leyton-Brown 2008) to describe dynamic informa-
tion searching behavior of uninformed receivers. Receiver not only communicates with 
his neighbors, but also searches new information source to take the place of the old 
neighbor who he thinks is the least reliable one. The searching behavior in our model is 
more conform to reality, and helps us to understand whether the asymmetric informa-
tion decreases if uninformed receivers has probability to find better information sources, 
which is not be addressed in the previous studies.
The model established in our study is not only based on theory and computer simula-
tion, but also based on real life examples provided by available literatures. One example 
is about the cheap talk communication in the real life. Lots of such kinds of commu-
nication examples existed on Internet. With stock messages board, twitter or blogs, 
information of listed companies is transmitted among individuals freely. However, the 
information on Internet may be not accurate. Some scholars have conducted studies 
about this phenomenon. As Depken and Zhang (2010) pointed, the messages issued 
through Internet messages board by authors are inherently a world of cheap talk. Their 
study suggested that high-reputation authors tend to offer accurate information stra-
tegically. Another example is about agents learning process. In real-world situations, 
individuals make decisions based on partial inputting information (experience) rather 
than fully rational. They will take certain learning behavior, like reinforcement learning, 
to making decision. Gan et al. (2012) organized experiments to study the information 
searching function of academic users. They found that the reinforcement learning mod-
els can appropriately fit the information searching process. Wang et al. (2014) employed 
a Rock-Paper-Scissors game experiment to test how individuals make decisions strategi-
cally. They also find that reinforcement learning model can be used for describing the 
decision making of individuals.
We test the impact of the accuracy of information transmission, the number of neigh-
bors and the percentage of relinking neighbors on the information identification of 
uninformed receivers. Our study finds that effect of the accuracy of information and the 
number of neighbors on information identification is positively related with the infor-
mation identification of uninformed receivers, but the effect of the number of relinking 
neighbors first shows a first increasing and then decreasing trend, which implicates that 
a moderate relinking number (searching behavior) might maximally eliminate the asym-
metric information between information senders and receivers.
Literature review
The initial cheap talk communications focused on characterizing the behaviors and 
strategies of individuals and continued the basic communication framework of one 
sender and one receiver, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Crawford (1998). These 
studies focused on the strategic communications with rational behavior in which an 
informed sender who is honest or dishonest sends a signal to the receivers, who take 
actions to identify whether the sender is honest or not. The model explained how infor-
mation is strategically transmitted when agents have partially aligned interests. Lots of 
studies Crawford and Sobel (1982), Blume et al. (2007), Galeotti et al. (2013), Benabou 
and Laroque (1988) and Farrel (1995) extended the initial communication framework 
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and found that the accuracy of information, number of agents (senders or receivers), 
and communication network are important factors for the identification ability of unin-
formed receivers.
Accuracy of information is important because the honest senders might be identified 
as the dishonest one if he observed false information and delivered it to receivers hon-
estly. Benabou and Laroque (1992) modeled such kind of communication in a stock mar-
ket. In the Benabou and Laroque (1992), senders had motivation to manipulate stock 
price by releasing noisy messages. Receivers can not distinguish the honest sender in the 
long run if the information is inaccurate and the dishonest sender change his commu-
nication strategy stochastically. Blume et al. (2007) found that adding an optimal noise 
level into the communicating information might improve the welfare of agents. Ben-
Porath (2003) considered the scenario of pre-play communication. Chakraborty and 
Harbaugh (2007) and Chen (2011) made more assumption on the accuracy of informa-
tion and the behavior of uninformed receivers.
There also has been a growing number of studies focusing on cheap talk communi-
cations with multiple senders and receivers. Krishna and Morgan (2001) built a model 
with two experts who have the same or opposite biases and communicate with receiv-
ers sequentially. In studies by Battaglini (2002) and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), the 
senders can observe the real states in all dimensions and their decisions are two-dimen-
sional variables. Klumpp (2007) introduced a sufficiently large number of informed 
senders and found that the information will be truthfully revealed to the uninformed 
receivers. Moreover, Klumpp (2007) drawn conclusion that as the number of informed 
traders increases, the estimations of firm value converges in probability, even though 
the informed traders retain some of their private information. Li (2010) studied a model 
with two experts observing a perfect reality but each of them has bias in his own private 
information.
The network structure of information transmission became another important topic in 
the recent strategic communication studies. Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) considered 
a network of strategic communication. They found that the connected network of agents 
has impact on the equilibrium of the model. In their model, every agent would like to 
take an action that is coordinated with those of others. An agent would reveal his infor-
mation to a group which is large enough, and his ideal action should be close to the aver-
age action of the other agents in that group. Galeotti et al. (2013) introduced a model 
that agent only sends messages to the agents who has a fixed link with him. They found 
that the equilibrium not only depends on the conflict of interests between the agents, 
but also on the network structures of the model. Agastya et al. (2015) investigated situ-
ations in which agents communicate with each other through a chain of intermediators 
and found that the loss of information relative to direct communication is proportional 
to the number of intermediators involved in the chain.
Our paper consider the network of communications as a dynamic one rather than a 
static one. Also, we consider the impact of accuracy of information and the number of 
agents on the identification of receivers under the condition of dynamic network. Our 
study is related with previous studies. We found that the accuracy of information and the 
number of neighbors positively related with the identification ability of receivers, which 
is consistent with the Benabou and Laroque (1992) and the Krishna and Morgan (2001) 
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or Klumpp (2007). Moreover, our paper made more considerations on the dynamic 
searching behavior in the cheap talk communication. We not only reach conclusions of 
available literatures about the influence of number of neighbors and information accu-
racy on identification, but also found relationships between the dynamic information 
communication network and identification ability, which are the previous models did 
not give a explicit description.
The model
Consider a communication in which the Sender Si (the informed agents, i = 1, . . . ,N) 
possesses private information about different issues that the Receiver Rj (the uninformed 
agents, j = 1, . . . ,M) takes actions on. The informed agents are further divided into two 
groups. One is the honest informed agents Sh, whose number is h, and who release the 
real information they receive, while the other is dishonest informed agents Sd, the quan-
tity of which is d, who release real or false information.
Uninformed agents only receive messages from their neighbors and do not share infor-
mation with each other. After sorting uninformed agents by current payoffs in every 
period, some of the uninformed agents at the lowest ranked locations will reselect their 
information sources, thus cutting off the informed agent he trusts the least and search-
ing for another informed agent who is not directly connected to him in the current com-
munication, thereby excluding the informed agent at the lowest ranked location in this 
period.
Decision‑making and prediction of individuals
At any period t (t = 1, . . . ,P) the real state of information is mt, which is a random 
sequence that follows a normal distribution N(0, 1). Information mi,t that the ith Sender 
receives at the same time is
where b · γ is the bias Sender i gets at period t from the real state, b ∼ N (0, 1), γ is the 
baseline of accuracy, which is a scalar parameter that we will use later to measure the 
accuracy of the information, such that the smaller that γ is, the higher the accuracy of 
the information the Sender receives is.
In our model, honest Senders would send the information as they receive it, mi,t, at 
period t, while the dishonest Senders probably send noisy messages to Receivers. We 
define noise using the Sigmoid function, which is a strictly increasing function having 
an“S” shape. We use a sigmoid function to model the relationship between noise and 
expectation is because that sigmoid function is a strictly increasing function. This func-
tion could reflect that higher expected payoffs the dishonest agents would like to get, the 
more noise he will release. In addition, S shaped also inflects the marginal decrease of 
noise that an informed agent sends to his neighbors. As the increase on expectation of 
informed agent, he will send larger noise. However, a larger noise is hardly accepted by 
the unformed agents, and will lead more decrease on informed agents reputation. There-
fore, we set a strictly increasing but marginal decrease function to describe the telling 
lies behavior of informed agents. Thus, for each dishonest Sender, the noise they will 
release is
(1)mi,t = mt + b · γ
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where xi,t is a pseudorandom integer equaling 0 or 1.
Thus, the information the dishonest Sender releases is
The payoffs depend on the difference between mi,t, the real states of information and 
yj,t, the action uninformed receiver j takes. When Receivers (uninformed agents) receive 
messages from the informed Senders whom they connects with at period t, they may 
accept or reject the messages depending on their strategies, which we will discuss in 
detail in the following sections. When uninformed receiver j chooses to trust the infor-
mation received from informed sender i at period t, we define parameter yj,t as equal to 
the information he received, that is, mi,t (if the informed sender is honest) or mi,t + ni,t 
(if the informed sender is dishonest). While if he does not trust the information received, 
parameter yj,t equals 0, which depends on mean of information real states of 1. So payoff 
of uninformed receiver j obtains at period t is
Because the actions of Receiver decide the payoffs of both sides, the payoff of informed 
senders depend on how many uninformed receivers choose to trust him in the period. 
Only uninformed receivers linked with him trust the information he released, he could 
obtain payoff from this communication. So, payoff of informed receiver i obtains at 
period t is
Strategy updates of individuals
In this section, we describe the informed and uninformed agents’ strategies when they 
make decisions in a typical period, which we will discuss below.
Strategies of informed agents
Information released by the honest and dishonest informed agents is given by Eqs. (1) 
and (3), respectively. The honest informed agents have only one strategy, to release the 
real information they receive. For the dishonest informed agents, they have a choice in 
every period to update their strategy and decide whether to release noisy information. 
In this paper, we follow the work of Borgers and Sarin (2000) and assume that dishon-
est informed agents update their strategies with a learning process. The learning pro-
cess assumes that agents have certain expectations of his chosen strategy. If the payoff 
brought by the current strategy can satisfies his expectations, he will increase his prob-
ability of current strategy in the next period, otherwise he will change his strategy.
The learning process is a Markovian process. Whether an agent will be more likely to 
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any period t, a dishonest informed agent i adopts a strategy si,t with an expected payoff 
Ei,t, but at period t, he is actually paid πi,t. Thus, at period t + 1 the probability pi(t + 1) 
of the agent lying can be expressed as:
If the agent lies at period t,
If the agent does not lie at period t,
where the agent’s payoff at period t + 1 is Ei,t+1 = β · πi,t + (1− β) · Ei,t.
Ei,t represents the expected payoff of an individual regarding his current strategy. With 
an exogenous aspiration level, if the actual payoff coming after strategy si,t is above some 
threshold Ei,t, the ith agent would be satisfied with his current strategy, and therefore 
he tends to choose si,t in the next period, and vice versa. Ei,t+1 reveals an agent’s endog-
enous expected payoff at period t + 1, which shows that the expected payoff in the next 
period will be between the expected payoff and actual return from this period. α is the 
rate of selected strategy adjustment, and β is the rate of adjustment of Ei,t+1, both of 
which are fixed values in our model between 0 and 1.
Strategies of uninformed agents
Uninformed agents also adopt the learning process to update the credibility of the 
informed agents connected to them in the communication. Presume that bi,j,t is the con-
fidence of the jth uninformed agent in the ith informed agent at the t information trans-
mission period. Whether the uninformed agent trusts the informed agent depends on 
the credibility bi,j,t of all of the informed agents connected to him. At one period, one 
uninformed agent may receive multiple messages from adjacent informed agents in the 
process of information transmission. We introduce a mechanism of competition with 
the aim that an uninformed agent can choose a message released by an informed agent 
in whom he has the highest confidence and update the confidence parameter bi,j,t for 
every informed agent connected to him based on the information from these sources.
We suppose an uninformed agent can only choose a message released from one of 
the information sources in whom he has the highest confidence. In addition, each unin-
formed agent records all of the messages passed to him. When he receives the actual 
states mt+1 in period t + 1, the uninformed agents will examine whether the informed 
agents have ever lied and make an adjustment regarding bi,j,t+1 their confidence in them 
in the next period. The method of adjustment is as follows:
where µi,j,t is the bias of information an uninformed agent j receives from the informed 





µi,j,t is an average 
value of all of the information biases that all of the uninformed agents receive from their 
informed neighbors with the real state at period t. θ is the rate of confidence adjustment 
(6)pi(t + 1) =
{
pi(t)+ α · (1− pi(t)), πi,t ≥ Ei,t
pi(t)− α · pi(t), πi,t < Ei,t
(7)pi(t + 1) =
{
pi(t)− α · pi(t), πi,t ≥ Ei,t







· θ , µi,j,t ≤ M¯i,j,t
bi,j,t − bi,j,t · θ , µi,j,t > M¯i,j,t
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of uninformed agents to informed agents, which is a fixed number between 0 and 1. 
When the information the ith informed agent provides to the jth uninformed agent is 
more precise than the average, µi,j,t ≤ M¯i,j,t, the jth uninformed agent will increase his 
confidence in the ith informed agent, and vice versa.
Searching behavior
In the information network construction, we assume each uninformed agent has k 
informed neighbors. In this network, only informed agents can become an information 
source. If the number of informed Senders i ≥ 2, there is more than one source of infor-
mation in the network.
Among informed agents, they do not convey messages to each other, they only release 
the messages to the uninformed agents who are linked to them. The uninformed agents 
can only receive messages from the informed agents who are linked to them, but they do 
not know whether the informed agents are honest. When they receive messages from 
informed agents in any period, they have the choice to believe one of the informed agent, 
which depends on the parameter called confidence in informed agents that is deter-
mined by the confidence one uninformed agent has in one informed agent based on the 
actions both have already taken. If an uninformed agent believes in one informed agent, 
the uninformed agent has the highest confidence, the uninformed agent will receive a 
messages from this informed agent and believe that it is true. Under the effect of this 
competitive atmosphere among informed agents, uninformed agents will preserve all of 
the messages released to them so they can update their confidence level in the informed 
agents who are adjacent to them. The informed agents also will be aware of how many 
uninformed agent accept his message. In each period, the payoff of one informed agents 
is the superposition of each payoff he gets from the uninformed agents he linked with. 
From the payoffs, an informed agent could learn whether the uninformed agents he 
linked with thinks he is honest or not. This is an endogenous and dynamic learning pro-
cess that the informed adjust strategies through the increased or decreased payoffs.
At the end of each period, some of uninformed agents update their information 
sources by cutting off their connection with one of the informed agents linked to them 
in whom they have the lowest confidence. The uninformed agent will find a new infor-
mation source to fill the vacancy. We define Ŵ as the percentage of relinks in each period. 
That is, after sorting uninformed agents by current payoffs in every period, Ŵ percent 
of uninformed agents at the lowest ranked locations will reselect their information 
sources. Suppose the jth uninformed agent is the agent who needs to take this action. 
The uninformed agent sorts the k informed agents who connect with him based on how 
well he trusts them (the parameter bi,j,t that we introduced above), and then he cuts off 
the informed agent k ′ whom he trusts the least and searches for another informed agent 
who is not directly connected to him in the network, but excluding informed agent k ′. 
By doing so, the uninformed agents can improve their searching behavior to receive 
more true messages as time passes. To simplify our modeling, there is no cost to identi-
fying the level of confidence in information sources, and uninformed agents select a new 
source of information to reconnect with at random and reset their trust, thus giving an 
initial value of 0.5 to their confidence in the newly linked informed agent.
A typical information transmission process is shown in Fig. 1.
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The simulation settings
The model requires the specification of a number of parameters that are summarized in 
Table 1 and discussed below.
In the baseline model, we have considered two types of agents, 900 uninformed agents 
and 100 informed agents, who are further divided into two groups, an honest group and 
a dishonest group, both of which account for 50 % of the total. The simulations consist 
of a number of information transmission periods P = 5000. Information on real states in 
every period is randomly generated from a normal distribution N (0, 1). At the beginning 
of the information transmission, informed agents (honest and dishonest) obtain accurate 
or inaccurate information with a certain probability, and then dishonest informed agents 
select effective strategies based on their actual income from the prior periods. We set 
scalar parameter γ to measure the accuracy of the information as 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
with the aim of examining the impact of the accuracy of the information. The smaller γ 
that is, the more precise information the informed agents will receive.
The simulations draw the information searching is set as follows. Not all uninformed 
agents find new information sources every period. Based on a wealth-driven mecha-
nism, all of the uninformed agents are arranged in descending order of the ranks of their 
payoffs from the communication, and only the bottom Ŵ percent of uninformed agents 
Fig. 1 Flow of the information transmission process
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face under economic incentive and look for better sources of information. Our model 
differs from that of others because our uninformed agents have searching behavior. This 
article will detect the impact of searching capabilities on the information identification 
of uninformed agents.
In the information transmission, every uninformed agent is linked with k informed 
agents, who are what we call neighbors. In our simulation, to ensure that uninformed 
agents have enough optional information sources and to verify the influence of the 
number of information sources on the identifications made by uninformed agents, k is 
assigned as 2, 4, 6, 8, 10.
Simulation analysis
In this section we analyze, via numerical simulations, the factors that influence informa-
tion identification implied by the model described in “The model” section. The results 
are outlined and discussed in this section.
The results reported here are the outcomes of simulations of 5000 periods, each of 
which we repeat 30 times using different random seeds for the random number genera-
tors. To test the influences on the information identification of the uninformed agents, 
we have repeated the simulations by varying the parameters sets of the accuracy of infor-
mation, the number of neighbors and the number of uninformed agents with searching 
behavior. Because the number of honest informed agents that uninformed agents choose 
to trust fully represents the informed agents’ identification, we mainly focus on these 
results instead of the other statistics.
Influence of variance of individual information sources
Our main aim in this section is to gain insights into the factors that influence unin-
formed agents’ information identification in the model. Some of the parameter settings 
for our simulations are presented in the previous section. In the base case, honest and 
dishonest informed agents are a fifty-fifty proportion, and the parameter γ measuring 
their information accuracy is 0.5, which typifies a relatively higher level of precision. In 
every period, the percentage of uninformed agents with searching behavior who will find 
Table 1 Model parameters
Base case
N Number of informed agents 100
M Number of uninformed agents 900
I Percentage of honest informed agents 50
Ŵ Number of uninformed agents with searching behavior 0, 10, 20, 30, 100, 300, 900
k Number of neighbors of uninformed agents 2, 4, 6, 8, 10
P Total number of periods 5000
mp Real states of information U[0, 1]
xi,p Pseudorandom integer 0, 1
b An array of random numbers from a normal distribution N[0, 1]
γ Scalar parameter measuring accuracy of the information 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
α Rate of selected strategy adjustment 0.05
β Rate of adjustment of expected payoff 0.9
θ Rate of trustworthiness adjustment 0.05
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a new neighbor with whom to relink will be Ŵ = 10. Under these settings, the number of 
neighbors in the different simulations ranged from 2 to 10.
The number of honest informed agents that uninformed agents choose to trust over 
time reveals the information identification ability of the uninformed agents observed in 
the simulations. Figure  2 contrasts the proportions of honest and dishonest informed 
agents that the uninformed agents choose to trust over time. Uninformed agents fail 
to distinguish honest agents from dishonest agents at the beginning, but as time goes 
by, uninformed agents begin to discern the honest agents in the first 500–1000 peri-
ods, and the proportion of honest agents starts to rise, while the proportion of dishon-
est agents falls. The proportion of honest agents then remains relatively stable at a high 
level after growing sharply. Taking into account the changes in the number of neighbors, 
Periods
















































































































Fig. 2 Proportions of the trusted honest agents and trusted dishonest agents. Proportions of honest agents 
(black) and dishonest informed agents (grey) that the uninformed agents choose to trust over time with the 
accuracy of information set at 0.5, the percentage of relink set at 10, and the uninformed agents have num-
bers of neighbors which equal to 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 in subfigure a to e respectively
Page 11 of 24Zhang et al. SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:707 
the changes in information identification ability coincide with the increase in the num-
ber of neighbors of the uninformed agents, thus showing an approximately positive and 
monotonous relationship. When the uninformed agents have fewer neighbors in their 
network, <70 % of the information they use is obtained from honest agents, and when 
the number of neighbors climbs to 10, more than 96 % of the information that the unin-
formed agents receive is released by honest agents. Keeping the number of honest and 
dishonest informed agents constant, the fewer neighbors the uninformed agents have, 
the more noisy messages that are spread through individuals in the communication, 
while the more neighbors the uninformed agents have, the more that truthful informa-
tion is widely disseminated. This result can be explained as when uninformed agents 
has more neighbors, they have more choices to select one information source to trust 
in, which is released by the informed agent with highest reputation. So more neighbors 
lead to more choices when one uninformed makes decisions and with valuing reputa-
tion, to make optimal decision. These conclusions consistent with the previous studies of 
Crawford and Sobel (1982), Blume et al. (2007), Galeotti et al. (2013) and Hagenbach and 
Koessler (2010).
It can be observed from the comparison that, with an increasing quantity of neigh-
bors, the ability of the uninformed agents to identify information improves. The more 
neighbors that one uninformed agent has, the earlier that agent will reach an equilib-
rium. Figure  2 shows that when one uninformed agent has only 2 neighbors, it takes 
him 1000 periods or even longer to achieve an equilibrium to identify honest informed 
agents from the dishonest agents, while when an uninformed agent has 6 or more neigh-
bors, he can quickly reach equilibrium. If an uninformed agent has more information 
sources, he can identify the honest sources more efficiently and precisely through the 
confidence parameter.
Table 2 shows the means and coefficients of the variations (C.V., also known as rela-
tive standard deviation, calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) 
of the proportion of honest informed agents under different conditions of quantity of 
neighbors ranging from 2 to 10. The average proportion of honest informed agents that 
the uninformed agents choose to believe in under the equilibrium states reflects, to a 
degree, the identification capabilities of the uninformed agents and illustrates the impact 
of noise on information transmission. The C.V. of the proportions reveal the stability of 
the agents’ identification ability. From Table 2, we can see that, when the parameter γ, 
which measures the accuracy of the information the informed agents receive, is set at 
0.5, the C.V. decreases with a varying number of neighbors. If we change the value of 
parameter γ, we find that the accuracy of the information has something to do with the 
identification ability of the uninformed agents. Comparing the statistics from Tables 3 
Table 2 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents with γ equals 0.5
The means and coefficients of the variations of the proportions of honest informed agents when the number of neighbors 
of the uninformed agents separately equal 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and the percentage of relinks equals 10
k = 2 (%) k = 4 (%) k = 6 (%) k = 8 (%) k = 10 (%)
Mean 70.75 84.06 92.81 94.64 96.97
C.V. 4.38 3.63 2.58 2.38 1.71
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and 4, we can conclude that when the informed agents receive relatively accurate infor-
mation from the model, the C.V. of the proportion decreases as the quantity of neighbors 
increases, but when the information captured within the model lacks sufficient preci-
sion, the C.V. increases progressively. The reason for this result can be explained as fol-
lows. When information accuracy is relative high, more neighbors one uninformed has, 
more choices he has to select an information source with highest reputation. Under con-
ditions with low information accuracy, the information uninformed receives is far from 
the real state of information. Even dishonest agents release noise to uninformed agents, 
it is not very easy for uninformed agents to tell the difference between noise and inac-
curacy of information, that made uninformed agents confused to identify. Further more, 
increasing number of neighbors may add to confusion during information identifying 
process. More neighbors (more information sources) may increase volatility of identifi-
cation capability. This result displays that information accuracy has a greater influence 
on identification. These conclusions consistent with the previous studies of Blume et al. 
(2007) and Farrel (1995).
We believe that the trends shown in Table 3 suggest that if the accuracy of information 
is high, the information that honest informed agents receive and release is close to the 
real state, so the profits of both sides would be satisfactory. Thus, the uniformed agents 
could easily establish confidence in the honest agents with whom they are linked, i.e. 
the confidence parameter bi,j,t is high, and most of the uninformed agents drive out the 
dishonest senders of information by their searching behavior. If one uniformed agent has 
more neighbors, it means that he has access to more information sources and chooses 
the one he is most confident in. A similar analysis can be made in Table 4, in which the 
accuracy of information is low. In this case, the information the informed agents receive 
is quite different from the real state, no matter whether the informed agent is honest, and 
the information that the uninformed agents receive from the informed agents may be 
far from the truth. Thus, the informed agents’ reputation endowed by the uninformed, 
which is used to reflect the reliability of the resources is relatively poor, even when one 
informed agent is honest and sends messages in accordance with what he receives. If 
the uninformed agents have more neighbors, there are more chances for the spreading 
Table 3 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents with γ equals 0.3
The means and coefficients of the variations of the proportions of honest informed agents when the number of neighbors 
of the uninformed agents separately equal 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and the percentage of relinks equals 10
k = 2 (%) k = 4 (%) k = 6 (%) k = 8 (%) k = 10 (%)
Mean 99.14 99.91 99.99 100.00 100.00
C.V. 0.39 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Table 4 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents with γ equals 0.9
The means and coefficients of the variations of the proportions of honest informed agents when the number of neighbors 
of the uninformed agents separately equal 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and the percentage of relinks equals 10
k = 2 (%) k = 4 (%) k = 6 (%) k = 8 (%) k = 10 (%)
Mean 49.83 57.81 63.55 66.75 70.31
C.V. 6.67 8.30 8.86 10.80 11.04
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of noise in the communications. Noise transmission interferes with the selection of the 
uninformed agents.
Table 5 presents the results of T tests for the proportions of honest informed agents 
that the uninformed agents choose to trust with different quantities of neighbors. The p 
values, except those for groups of 6 and 8, and 8 and 10, shown in the table suggest that 
each two data sets with different numbers of neighbors are significantly different from 
each other. However, when the uninformed agents have enough neighbors, the impact of 
the changes in the quantity of neighbors on identification ability is mild. This finding is 
further corroborated by Fig. 3. Under the condition that the index measuring informa-
tion accuracy equals 0.3, fewer neighbors has a relatively strong impact on the stability 
of agents’ identification ability in comparison with having more neighbors.
Influence of information accuracy
The accuracy of the information informed agents receive has a significant impact on the 
identification abilities of the uninformed agents. In this new case, we maintain the same 
network structure, we set 4 neighbors for every uninformed agent and we make an equal 
split between honest and dishonest informed agents. In every period, there are 10 % of 
Table 5 T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different 
quantities of neighbors with whom the uninformed agents connected
Significant at the 1 % critical level using a two-tail test
p value of the T test result for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different quantities of neighbors with 
whom the uninformed agents connected. The accuracy of information is 0.3, and the percentage of relinks equals 10
Neighbor 2 4 6 8 10
2 – 7.3308E−096 2.6701E−125 1.7400E−151 1.0429E−179
4 7.3308E−96 – 1.3457E−004 7.9350E−009 4.0679E−015
6 2.6701E−125 1.3457E−004 – 0.1017 7.3103E−004
8 1.7400E−151 7.9350E−009 0.1017 – 0.0709
10 1.0429E−179 4.0679E−015 7.3101E−004 0.0709 –



















Fig. 3 The changes in information identification by variances in the number of neighbors. The changes in 
uninformed agents’ information identification resulting from variances in the number of neighbors the unin-
formed agents have where the accuracy of information equals 0.3, and the percentage of relink is 10
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uninformed agents who will find a new neighbor with whom to link. Under these condi-
tions, we change the parameter of the accuracy of the information, γ, in different simula-
tions ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. Lower values mean that the information is more accurate.
Figure 4 illustrates what happens to the information identification of the uninformed 
agents as the information accuracy changes. We find that the effect of information accu-
racy on identification is positive and monotonous. When the informed agents receive 
precise information in the simulations, the uninformed agents can pick out the honest 
agents from the dishonest agents rapidly and accurately. If the information is inaccurate, 
the identification ability plummets, especially when the parameter γ equals 0.9, when 
the uninformed agents can hardly distinguish the honest agents from the dishonest 
agents from the beginning of the simulations to the end. Under this circumstance, the 
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Fig. 4 Proportions of the trusted honest agents and trusted dishonest agents. Proportions of honest 
informed agents (black) and dishonest informed agents (grey) whom the uninformed agents choose to trust 
over time with the number of neighbors set at 4 and the percentage of relink set at 10. The accuracy of the 
information changes with value 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 in subfigure a to e respectively
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uninformed agents are paid less and information the uninformed agents receive from 
their honest neighbors is not much different from that received from dishonest neigh-
bors, even though the honest agents never lies.
Table 6 reveals the obvious relationship between information accuracy and informa-
tion identification. C.V., which represents the stability of agents’ identification capa-
bilities, increases as parameter γ increases. Highly accurate information helps the 
uninformed agents make a distinction between the honest and the dishonest informed 
agents, this result is the same as our intuition.
The T tests for information accuracy were also checked and the results are shown in 
Table  7. The p values shown in the table, suggest that each two data sets with differ-
ent information accuracy levels are significantly different from each other. This result 
indicates that the accuracy of the information that the informed agents receive plays an 
important role in the identification abilities of the uninformed agents when they choose 
information sources. Figure 5 also shows this difference.
Influence of the percentage of relinks
Varying both individual information sources and the accuracy of information can change 
the identification abilities of the uninformed agents. However, how does the searching 
behavior of the uninformed agents change? Some insight into this issue can be provided 
by analyzing the impact of the percentage of reconnects on information identification. 
In this section, we change the percentage of uninformed agents with searching behavior, 
that is, those who disconnect with one of their neighbors and find a new source with 
whom to reconnect, from Ŵ = 0, 10, 20, 30, and 100. To eliminating the effect of infor-
mation accuracy and the quantity of neighbors, we test the effect of the changes in the 
Table 6 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents
The means and coefficients of the variations of the proportions of honest informed agents when the accuracy of the 
information separately equals 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, the number of neighbors one uninformed agent has equals 4, and the 
percentage of relinks is 10
γ = 0.1 (%) γ = 0.3 (%) γ = 0.5 (%) γ = 0.7 (%) γ = 0.9 (%)
Mean 100.00 99.91 84.06 66.79 57.81
C.V. 0.00 0.10 3.63 6.44 8.30
Table 7 T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different 
information accuracy
Significant at the 1 % critical level using a two-tail test
p value of T test result for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different information accuracy when the 
number of neighbors that one uninformed agent has equals 4, and the percentage of relinks equals 10
γ 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 – 2.1915E−23 0 0 0
0.3 2.1915E−23 – 0 0 0
0.5 0 0 – 0 0
0.7 0 0 0 – 0
0.9 0 0 0 0 –
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percentage of uninformed agents with searching behavior on identification with various 
levels of information accuracy and numbers of neighbors.
Figure 6 illustrates what happens to the information sources of the uninformed agents 
with different levels of searching behavior in the base case. As observed from the figures 
intuitively, the percentage of uninformed agents with searching behavior does not show 
a monotonous relationship with information identification that would affect the quality 
of information transmitted in communication, as the other two factors do. Viewed from 
the perspective of information sources and the quantity of neighbors, there are same 
trends in information identification with changes in the searching behavior of the unin-
formed agents in the simulation.
The average probability weights for the proportion of informed agents whom the unin-
formed agents trusts across the thirty base case runs are presented in Table  8. Under 
different conditions of information accuracy, the identification ability of the uninformed 
agents first increases and then decreases when the number of relinks increases. Under 
our parameter settings, when the percentage of relinks equals 10 (there are 10 % of unin-
formed agents that have the searching behavior), the information identification ability of 
the uninformed agents is strongest, and the stability of the agents’ identification capabil-
ity is stable, while when the percentage of relinks is 100 (all of the uninformed agents 
search for new information sources), the uninformed agents have the lowest capability 
of information identification. That is, when the percentage of relinks is small, searching 
behavior leads to moderate improvements in information identification. However, when 
the percentage of relinks becomes large enough, searching behavior has a negative effect 
on the identification ability of the uninformed agents. The coefficients of the variances, 
which represent the degree of stability, have no obvious regularities.
A further test of the impact of the percentage of relinks on the information identifica-
tion under situations with different numbers of neighbors is shown in Table 9. We reach 
a similar conclusion that identification ability first increases and then decreases. The 













Fig. 5 The changes in information identification by variances in information accuracy. The changes in the 
uninformed agents’ information identification resulting from variances in the accuracy of information when 
the number of neighbors that one uninformed agent has equals 4, and the percentage of relink is 10
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values presented in Table 9 indicate that when 10, 20 or 30 % of uninformed agents have 
searching behavior, they have the strongest identification ability, and from this perspec-
tive, searching behavior leads to moderate improvements in information identification. 
As the percentage gradually increases, however, identification ability shows a downward 
trend, especially when Ŵ equals 100, the identification ability of the uninformed agents is 
obviously reduced.
Instinctively, the identification ability should increase with searching behavior because 
the searching behavior that we introduced provides the agents with the ability to choose a 
new informed neighbor, which seems as if it should improve the uninformed agents’ iden-
tification performance. However, the results shown above do not match this assumption. 
To explain these results, we might consider in the real world, the decision to find a new 
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Fig. 6 Proportions of the trusted honest agents and trusted dishonest agents. Proportions of honest 
informed agents (black) and dishonest informed agents (grey) that the uninformed agents choose to trust 
over time with the number of neighbors set at 2 and γ set at 0.3. The percentage of relink changes with 
value 0, 10, 20, 30, 100 in subfigure a to e respectively
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informed neighbor may be based on economic inventive. At the end of each period, under 
our experimental setup, every uniformed agent is supposed to examine how well he per-
formed in that period compared with other agents. If his payoff is less than the average 
payoff, he has an incentive to find a new informed neighbor, even if the new informa-
tion source is dishonest and the old one is honest. As the number of relinks grows, more 
Table 9 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents with different percentages of relinks under different numbers of neigh-
bors
The means and coefficients of the variations of the proportions of honest informed agents with different percentages of 
relinks under different numbers of neighbors when the accuracy of information equals 0.3
Ŵ = 0 (%) Ŵ = 10 (%) Ŵ = 20 (%) Ŵ = 30 (%) Ŵ = 100 (%)
k = 2
 Mean 70.58 99.14 96.09 93.91 83.11
 C.V. 2.68 0.39 0.96 1.45 2.79
k = 4
 Mean 96.48 99.91 99.61 99.31 96.56
 C.V. 0.97 0.10 0.27 0.38 1.00
k = 6
 Mean 99.75 99.99 99.97 99.93 99.25
 C.V. 0.23 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.42
k = 8
 Mean 99.96 100.00 100.00 99.99 99.90
 C.V. 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.13
k = 10
 Mean 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99
 C.V. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
Table 8 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents with  different percentages of  relinks under  different information accu-
racy levels
The means and coefficients of variations in the proportions of honest informed agents with different percentages of relinks 
under different information accuracy levels when the number of neighbors of the uninformed agents equals 4
Ŵ = 0 (%) Ŵ = 10 (%) Ŵ = 20 (%) Ŵ = 30 (%) Ŵ = 100 (%)
γ = 0.1
 Mean 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
 C.V. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ = 0.3
 Mean 96.48 99.91 99.61 99.31 96.56
 C.V. 0.97 0.10 0.27 0.38 1.00
γ = 0.5
 Mean 77.27 84.06 77.36 75.30 70.15
 C.V. 4.96 3.63 4.58 5.30 5.22
γ = 0.7
 Mean 59.94 66.79 63.38 61.11 57.30
 C.V. 7.15 6.44 7.43 7.49 7.94
γ = 0.9
 Mean 55.55 57.81 55.83 52.92 54.36
 C.V. 8.49 8.30 7.65 9.25 8.33
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uninformed agents are exposed to the incentive, which makes the uninformed agents 
overreact or react inappropriately because of their relatively poorer payoffs.
Identification by the uninformed agents, on the condition that each uninformed agent 
has 4 neighbors and the parameter, γ, which measures information accuracy, equals 0.3, 
was tested and compared by T tests between groups. The results shown in Table 10 sug-
gest that each group of two data sets with different percentages of relinks is significantly 
different. This result means that when the uninformed agents have 4 neighbors and the 
accuracy of information is set at 0.3, the quantity of uninformed agents with searching 
behavior has obvious significance to identification ability.
However, the results become different when the level of information accuracy changes. 
To examine the similarity of the data under the situations where the number of relinks 
is 10 and 100 in Table 8, a T test for the two groups was performed. The results are pre-
sented in Table 11. The p value is much different when the accuracy equals 0.1 from the 
other situations, which means that when information is extremely precisely transmitted 
in communication, the quantity of uninformed agents with searching behavior does not 
impact their identification ability. Table 12 displays the p value and the results of the T 
tests between the two groups with the percentage of relinks set at 0 and 100, and the 
results are similar to those shown in Table 9. The data for the two groups show statistical 
Table 10 T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with differ-
ent percentages of relinks
Significant at the 1 % critical level using a two-tail test
p value of T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different percentages of relinks when the 
number of neighbors that one uninformed agent has equals 4, and the accuracy of information equals 0.3
Ŵ 0 10 20 30 100
0 – 0 0 0 1.3163E−004
10 0 – 2.0069E−005 8.2040E−015 0
20 0 2.0069E−005 – 4.1918E−004 0
30 0 8.2040E−015 4.1918E−004 – 0
100 1.3163E−004 0 0 0 –
Table 11 T test results for the proportions of the trusted honest informed agents with the 
percentage of relinks set at 10 and 100
Significant at the 1 % critical level using a two-tail test
p value of T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different information accuracy when the 
number of neighbors that one uninformed agent has equals 4
γ = 0.1 γ = 0.3 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.7 γ = 0.9
p value 0.5372 0 0 0 2.7504E−205
Table 12 T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with the per-
centage of relinks set at 0 and 100
Significant at the 1 % critical level using a two-tail test
p value of T test results for the proportions of trusted honest informed agents with different numbers of neighbors that one 
uninformed agent has when the accuracy of information equals 0.3
k = 2 k = 4 k = 6 k = 8 k = 10
p value 0 1.3163E−04 2.4366E−20 0.4438 0.5528
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differences at a 1 % significance level. When the number of neighbors is high (equals 8 or 
more), the p value is much different from the other situations, which means that when 
uninformed has more neighbors, the percentage of uninformed agents with searching 
behavior does not impact their identification ability. But under other situations, the 
impacts of having no uninformed agents with searching behavior and all uninformed 
agents with searching behavior on information identification is quite different.
Table 13 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents uninformed trusted with different uninformed to informed ratio
1. Investigating the effect of the number of neighbors on information identification under different uninformed to informed 
ratios, other parameters are set as base case, honest and dishonest informed agents are a 55 proportion, the parameter 
measuring their information accuracy is 0.5, and percentage of relink is 10
2. Investigating the effect of information accuracy on information identification under different uninformed to informed 
ratios, other parameters are set as base case, honest and dishonest informed agents are a 55 proportion, the number of 
neighbors is 4, and percentage of relink is 10
3. Investigating the effect of percentage of relink on information identification under different uninformed to informed 
ratios, other parameters are set as base case, honest and dishonest informed agents are a 55 proportion, the number of 
neighbors is 4 and the parameter measuring their information accuracy is 0.5
Neighbors = 2  
(%)
Neighbors = 4  
(%)
Neighbors = 6  
(%)
Neighbors = 8  
(%)
Neighbors = 10 
(%)
Ru:Ri = 9:1
 Mean 70.75 84.06 92.81 94.64 96.97
 C.V. 4.38 3.63 2.58 2.38 1.71
Ru:Ri = 5:5
 Mean 74.25 78.96 83.47 86.38 87.94
 C.V. 4.11 3.80 4.04 3.79 3.72
Ru:Ri = 1:9
 Mean 71.36 80.51 85.28 89.97 91.81
 C.V. 6.36 5.43 5.04 4.07 4.12
γ = 0.1 (%) γ = 0.3 (%) γ = 0.5 (%) γ = 0.7 (%) γ = 0.9 (%)
Ru:Ri = 9:1
 Mean 100.00 99.91 84.06 66.79 57.81
 C.V. 0.00 0.10 3.63 6.44 8.30
Ru:Ri = 5:5
 Mean 99.78 97.72 78.96 67.25 60.82
 C.V. 1.90 2.55 3.80 4.59 4.78
Ru:Ri = 1:9
 Mean 99.33 96.26 80.51 67.83 61.09
 C.V. 1.80 3.38 5.43 7.06 8.54
relink = 0 (%) relink = 10 (%) relink = 20 (%) relink = 30 (%) relink = 100 (%)
Ru:Ri = 9:1
 Mean 70.58 99.14 96.09 93.91 83.11
 C.V. 2.68 0.39 0.96 1.45 2.79
Ru:Ri = 5:5
 Mean 77.81 95.36 93.20 91.51 82.34
 C.V. 2.88 3.16 2.91 2.90 2.96
Ru:Ri = 1:9
 Mean 80.63 89.90 85.00 82.80 68.81
 C.V. 4.48 4.00 4.89 5.22 7.69
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Robustness analysis
There are two constant ratios in the settings of agents, that is, 9:1 uninformed to 
informed ratio and 50:50 split on informed agents with honest and dishonest. To address 
the issue that whether these constant ratios will affect our results, we make robust-
ness tests in this section. Specifically, we reset uninformed to informed ratio (Ru:Ri in 
Table 13) as 9:1, 5:5, 1:9, and reset honest to dishonest ratio (Rh:Rd in Table 14) as 3:7, 
5:5, 7:3 to see whether our initial conclusions holds.
Table 14 The means and  coefficients of  the variations of  the proportions of  honest 
informed agents uninformed trusted with different honest to dishonest ratio
1. Investigating the effect of the number of neighbors on information identification under different honest to dishonest 
ratios, other parameters are set as base case, uninformed to informed ratio is 9:1, the parameter measuring their information 
accuracy is 0.5, and percentage of relink is 10
2. Investigating the effect of information accuracy on information identification under different honest to dishonest ratios, 
other parameters are set as base case, uninformed to informed ratio is 9:1, the number of neighbors is 4, and percentage of 
relink is 10
3. Investigating the effect of percentage of relink on information identification under different honest to dishonest ratios, 
other parameters are set as base case, uninformed to informed ratio is 9:1, the number of neighbors is 4 and the parameter 
measuring their information accuracy is 0.5
Neighbors = 2  
(%)
Neighbors = 4  
(%)
Neighbors = 6  
(%)
Neighbors = 8  
(%)
Neighbors = 10 
(%)
Rh:Rd = 3:7
 Mean 35.81 40.87 42.85 46.43 49.91
 C.V. 11.20 15.61 18.83 15.60 22.26
Rh:Rd = 5:5
 Mean 70.75 84.06 92.81 94.64 96.97
 C.V. 4.38 3.63 2.58 2.38 1.71
Rh:Rd = 7:3
 Mean 77.52 81.89 84.56 84.40 85.98
 C.V. 3.90 5.65 6.41 8.14 9.26
γ = 0.1 (%) γ = 0.3 (%) γ = 0.5 (%) γ = 0.7 (%) γ = 0.9 (%)
Rh:Rd = 3:7
 Mean 97.52 54.42 40.87 34.40 32.76
 C.V. 5.71 10.77 15.61 16.05 18.10
Rh:Rd = 5:5
 Mean 100.00 99.91 84.06 66.79 57.81
 C.V. 0.00 0.10 3.63 6.44 8.30
Rh:Rd = 7:3
 Mean 99.50 91.64 81.89 73.03 75.34
 C.V. 1.54 5.00 5.65 7.49 6.92
relink = 0 (%) relink = 10 (%) relink = 20 (%) relink = 30 (%) relink = 100 (%)
Rh:Rd = 3:7
Mean 35.15 50.41 42.78 41.74 39.62
C.V. 6.46 11.53 11.08 12.63 10.65
Rh:Rd = 5:5
Mean 70.58 99.14 96.09 93.91 83.11
C.V. 2.68 0.39 0.96 1.45 2.79
Rh:Rd = 7:3
Mean 76.75 88.76 83.03 84.52 80.30
C.V. 3.18 4.19 4.58 3.74 4.41
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In order to measure the effect of uninformed to informed ratio on the number of 
neighbors, we set other parameters as same as base case, that is, honest and dishonest 
informed agents are a 55 proportion, the parameter γ measuring their information accu-
racy is 0.5, and percentage of relink, Ŵ, is 10. Under these settings, the number of neigh-
bors in the simulations ranged from 2 to 10 under different uninformed to informed 
ratios. We report the mean proportions of honest informed agents trust by uninformed 
agents over time and C.V. in Table 13.
Comparing data in the first part of Table 13, displays the robustness check for unin-
formed to informed ratio. Under different ratios, the ability of the uninformed agents to 
identify information improves with increasing quantities of neighbors. The result illus-
trates the information identification is robust to the number of neighbors with different 
uninformed to informed ratio.
To measure the impacts of uninformed to informed ratio on the accuracy of infor-
mation, we set same parameters as base case, that is, 4 neighbors for every uninformed 
agent and an equal split between honest and dishonest informed agents. In every period, 
there are 10 % of uninformed agents who will find a new neighbor to link. Under these 
conditions, we change the parameter of the accuracy of the information, γ, ranging from 
0.1 to 0.9, in simulations with different uninformed to informed ratios.
Comparing data in the second part of Table 13, though the volatilities of these figures 
are not exactly same, means and C.V.s under different ratios show the same tendency. 
The contrast among three sets of data profiles robustness of information identification to 
the number of neighbors with different uninformed to informed ratio.
In the same manner, we set other parameters as same as base case and vary the percent 
of relink to measure the robustness of information identification under different unin-
formed to informed ratios. Comparing data in the third part of Table 13, we learn that 
information identification does not show a monotonous relationship for the percentage 
of relink. The results remain presenting a first an increasing and then a decreasing trend.
Also we test the robustness of the honest to dishonest ratios on initial conclusions in 
Table 14. The parameters of the number of neighbors, the accuracy of information, the 
percentage of relink and the 9:1 uninformed to informed ratio are same as base case, 
which are also shown on previous simulations. We reset honest to dishonest ratio at 3:7 
and 7:3 to exam the information identification trends present the same pattern with 5:5 
honest to dishonest ratio of base case. Also, we report the mean proportions of honest 
informed agents trust by uninformed agents over time and C.V. in Table 14.
The effect of honest to dishonest ratio on the number of neighbors are presented in 
Table 14. Comparing data in the first part of Table 14, when the percentage of dishon-
est informed agents increases, the identification becomes more volatile. But the tenden-
cies are same under different ratios. This could illustrate the information identification is 
robust to the number of neighbors with different honest to dishonest ratio.
Measurement results of the impacts of honest to dishonest ratio on the accuracy of 
information are shown in Table 14. Comparing data in the second part of Table 14, we 
learn robustness of information identification to the number of neighbors with different 
honest to dishonest ratio.
Similarly, we vary the percent of relink to measure the robustness of honest to dis-
honest ratio. Data in the third part of Table  14 present the same trend. When none 
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possessing searching behavior, the information identification is relative low. As the per-
centage of relink gradually increases, identification ability shows a downward trend. 
When all of uninformed getting searching behavior, the identification ability is obviously 
reduced.
The comparison results in this section display the robustness check for effectiveness of 
information identification with two ratios, the uninformed to informed ratio and hon-
est to dishonest ratio. This evidence demonstrates that the three factors, accuracy of 
information, the number of neighbors and percentage of relink, play significant roles in 
information identification of uninformed agents, while the number of uninformed and 
informed agents in population and the number of honest and dishonest in informed 
agents do not. In summary, the tests with certain assumptions here identify the three 
factors mainly affect information identification is reliable.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a model of cheap talk communication while adding dynamic 
searching behavior for individuals. We set our model as a agent-based environment 
where informed players, either honest or dishonest, can transmit their information stra-
tegically to uninformed receivers who are connected with them in a communication net-
work. In each period, the payoffs everyone receives and the reputations of the informed 
agents help receivers adjust their strategies accordingly. Moreover, receivers have ability 
to change one of his informed neighbors as into a new one in the market. We studied 
the impacts of the accuracy of information, the number of neighbors and the percentage 
of uninformed agents with searching behavior on the information identification of the 
uninformed agents.
Through agent-based modeling and data analysis, we found that an increasing num-
ber of neighbors has a positive influence on the uninformed agents’ information iden-
tification. Additionally, when the information the informed agents receive is relatively 
accurate, the stability of identification increases together with an increasing percent-
age of neighbors, but when the information captured within the model lacks sufficient 
precision, the stability progressively decreases. Another result is that the improvements 
in information accuracy can improve information selection and identification abilities. 
The stability of identification also changes with the information accuracy. Moreover, the 
third conclusion of this paper is that the dynamic searching behavior of receivers has 
nonlinear impact on their identification abilities. Under different conditions of infor-
mation accuracy, the identification ability of uninformed agents shows a trend that first 
increases and then decreases when the percentage of relinks is increasing. When there 
are 10, 20 or 30  % uninformed receivers who has ability to search a new information 
sources in the market, the receivers group has the strongest identification ability.
Our model can be extended in several directions. For instance, models can be devel-
oped with individuals in a complex information environment searching for, obtaining 
and processing information in different ways, by focusing on individual behaviors, or by 
having uninformed agents send and receive messages from other uninformed agents to 
study how the equilibrium communication strategies change when the search scope of 
the uninformed agents varies.
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